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Definition
Objectivity – the quality of existing independently
of a subject’s beliefs or desires. Not dependent for
its properties on any person’s subjective experi-
ence. Typically discoverable by publicly available
and evaluable means.
Introduction
For purposes of this entry, a domain of facts is
objective if those facts both (a) exist and (b) are
mind-independent, meaning they do not depend
for their existence on any human beliefs, attitudes,
or desires (though for simpliﬁcation, this article
will only refer to beliefs in what follows). Accord-
ingly, moral facts are objective just insofar as they
both exist and are mind-independent. Here, the
focus will be on how evolutionary considerations
bear on the objectivity of morality. This article
will not consider other ways in which evolution-
ary considerations bear on other moral phenom-
ena, including how they might have shaped core
moral emotions such as compassion or shame or
widespread moral practices such as reciprocation
and punishment.
For many philosophers, the objectivity of
morality constitutes a “fundamental commitment”
(Wong 2014, p. 337); the objective demands of
morality are “nonnegotiable” (Joyce 2006,
p. 117). Psychologists also discuss morality in
objectivist terms, drawing clear distinctions
between social or conventional norms on the one
hand and moral norms on the other. According
to one inﬂuential account, moral norms are distin-
guished in being universalizable and, more impor-
tantly, applicable independent of any authority
or sanction (Turiel 1983).
Additionally, nearly all philosophers and psy-
chologists also maintain that ordinary folk are
committed to objectivism about morality, such
that if two people disagree about the moral status
of a moral claim – say, whether or not discrimi-
nating against someone on the basis of their
sexual orientation is morally permissible – at
most one of them can be correct (e.g., Smith
1994; Shafer-Landau 2003). The “philosopher’s
task,” according to one prominent account, is to
make sense of precisely the puzzling objectivity
of morality (Smith 1994). Philosophers predomi-
nantly base their claims by canvassing the nature
of moral language and debate, by examining ordi-
nary intuitions about the moral domain, and by
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reﬂecting on the phenomenology or felt experi-
ence of moral life (Gill 2009). Psychologists, by
contrast, have tested this claim using experimental
methods, with several studies showing that indi-
viduals do, in fact, show objectivist tendencies
(for a review, see Sarkissian 2016).
Evolutionary Arguments and Skepticism
About Objectivity
Recently, some researchers have suggested that
evolutionary theory can pose a serious threat
to the purported objectivity of morality. Speciﬁ-
cally, it can undermine the notion that most com-
monsense and widespread moral beliefs are
justiﬁed by referring to mind-independent moral
facts. Evolutionary explanations of commonsense
moral beliefs do not, in themselves, lead us to
deny or rule out the existence of mind-
independent moral facts. Indeed, this is not the
general strategy of such “debunking” explana-
tions (Nichols 2014). Instead, evolutionary expla-
nations are thought to undermine the warrant or
justiﬁcation of these beliefs. They can do so in
several ways. Such explanations can provide a
complete or convincing account of the causal
processes giving rise to the belief in question
without, at any point, having to say anything at
all concerning whether or not that belief tracks
any facts or truths about the world (Joyce 2006).
Or, such explanations can show that the psycho-
logical processes that generate the belief in ques-
tion are not the sorts of processes that could
plausibly result in true, factual beliefs (Nichols
2014) or argue that whatever ends are supported
by a theory of Darwinian natural selection – be
they the ﬂourishing of the gene, the individual, or
the group – such ends cannot be moral ends
(Sommers and Rosenberg 2003).
Regardless of these differences, all such
accounts have the same strategy of arguing that
the best evolutionary account of the origins of
humans’ moral faculties and beliefs will refer to
their ﬁtness-enhancing properties, which have no
bearing on whether or not the beliefs track mind-
independent moral facts. Presumably ancestral
humans gained adaptive advantages over their
rivals by cultivating or maintaining certain moral
beliefs about themselves and others – whether
in-group or out-group members. The differential
reproductive success conferred on ancestral
humans by adopting these beliefs would lead to
their propagation. Humans inherit these beliefs
today as part of their cognitive architecture. How-
ever, whatever moral beliefs they have as a result
of such a process cannot be justiﬁed by claiming
that they track mind-independent moral facts.
One widely cited account presents a dilemma
for moral realists (Street 2006). If evolutionary
forces played a pervasive role in the production
and maintenance of moral beliefs, what could
be the relation between these evolutionarily
shaped beliefs and any mind-independent moral
facts? There are two options, neither of which is
attractive or acceptable, hence the dilemma. The
ﬁrst horn of the dilemma claims that mind-
independent moral facts are not at all related to
the evolutionary pressures on moral beliefs. But
this implies an implausible general skepticism
about the truth of many commonsense ethical
claims, even intuitive claims such as that it is
right to take care of one’s children. This is
because even though this judgment seems obvi-
ously true – indeed, true in a way that does not
require the endorsement of any particular person’s
beliefs – ancestral humans would have not con-
verged on this belief because it referred to a mind-
independent fact. Instead, those who had such
beliefs were simply more ﬁt than others. The
second horn of the dilemma claims that there is,
indeed, some relation between mind-independent
moral facts and the evolutionary pressures on
moral beliefs. The ancestors of modern humans
reaped adaptive advantage precisely by means of
tracking independent moral truths. However, this
leads to a different, but no less serious, problem:
it requires some plausible “tracking” account,
and. any such account seems otiose. It would be
more parsimonious to leave out mind-
independent moral facts and just focus on the
adaptive links that ancestral humans forged
between their circumstances and their responses
to those circumstances. The latter account would
also have greater explanatory power through its
ability to describe how they had beliefs that
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contemporary society now regards as false (like
the tendency to prefer in-groups to out-groups;
Street 2006, p. 134). By contrast, a tracking
account fails to easily explain the origin or persis-
tence of such false beliefs.
Joyce (2006, 2016) makes a similar argument,
criticizing accounts of moral judgment that
attempt to show that evolutionary forces produced
in human minds a moral truth-tracking faculty.
Joyce focused on the function of moral judgment
in human beings: could it be to track mind-
independent moral facts? Some faculties do
appear to be truth-tracking in this sense: mathe-
matical representations seem to track mathemati-
cal truth because an organism only derives
adaptive advantage from true mathematical judg-
ments and not from false ones. (E.g., a person that
judged that 2 + 3 = 6 would be at a signiﬁcant
disadvantage compared to another that judged that
2 + 3 = 5). However, as Joyce argues, there is no
comparable beneﬁt to making true moral judg-
ments. The moral faculty (such as it is and putting
to one side the question of whether such a faculty
even exists) does not appear to give its bearers
advantage on the basis of its truth-tracking (Joyce
2006). Instead, to the extent that a moral faculty
can be given an evolutionary explanation, it
appears to have given ancestral humans an advan-
tage in virtue of its other (non-truth-tracking) fea-
tures, for example, signaling one’s sincere
commitment to social projects or maintaining
one’s reputation in the group (c.f. Miller 2007;
Nesse 2009). Since one should not expect moral
judgments to do anything other than what they
were selected for, and since they were not selected
for truth-tracking, this provides a plausible reason
for doubting that moral judgments are formed by a
reliable process.
Many theorists have argued that in the absence
of good arguments against the justiﬁcation of
moral beliefs, those beliefs ought to be regarded
as justiﬁed (Wielenberg 2010; Enoch 2011).
However, the arguments above turn the tables on
any such account when applied to the moral
domain. Any account which claims that there
exist moral faculties that in fact track objective
moral facts must now present plausible explana-
tions arguing for the existence of such facts and
their respective faculties. Given the success of
evolutionary accounts to provide explanations
for a range of phenomena, the burden of proof
shifts to those who wish to defend mind-
independent moral objectivism.
Evolution’s Contribution to Perceived
Moral Objectivity
However, even while maintaining that mind-
independent moral facts are a ﬁction, Joyce
(2006) nonetheless speculated that a tendency to
see morality in objective terms is an evolutionary
adaptation. Evolutionary forces selected for indi-
viduals who were highly motivated to act upon
ﬁtness-enhancing beliefs, including moral beliefs.
Seeing morality as objective (independent of one-
self) would be a much stronger motivator to act
than seeing morality as mere subjective prefer-
ence. For example, when one says that a person
ought not to steal, one does not take oneself to be
merely asserting that it is within the person’s set of
current desires that she not steal. Even if she does
strongly desire to steal and thinks it a great idea,
this has no impact on the fact that she ought not
steal. The challenge for anyone who endorses
moral objectivity is to show exactly how such
“categorical imperatives” are possible. The stan-
dard approach is to show that every agent (or at
least every rational agent) has some reason to be
moral. This article will not be detained with the
details of that discussion. The important point is
that when one condemns those who commit atroc-
ities such as genocide, coming to learn that the
perpetrators are furthering their goals through
genocide would not at all mitigate one’s condem-
nation. It does not matter how the perpetrators feel
about moral norms; moral norms apply to them
regardless of what they feel. This seems a perva-
sive aspect of moral life.
As noted above, some take this objective
categoricity to be a “nonnegotiable” part of the
moral domain – a central tenet that any theory of
morality must explain. Discovering that such a
central tenet is false can reveal the discourse to
be systematically ﬂawed. If moral discourse is in
fact committed to such categorical judgments,
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then evolutionary debunking arguments
(as discussed above) will imply moral skepticism.
This leaves a question: Why do some philoso-
phers take objectivity to be such a central part of
moral discourse and practice to begin with? Why
does it seem to be a feature of morality that moral
facts exist? Whence comes the perception that
morality is mind-independent in the ﬁrst place?
Here, it may be instructive to separate
two issues, following Edouard Machery and
Ron Mallon (2010). The ﬁrst concerns why one
would be expected to adopt norms of behavior
that, in general, come with costs and may serve
to stiﬂe or frustrate some of one’s current desires.
Call this “normative cognition,” involving such
concepts as “should” or “ought” or “ought not.” It
is rather uncontroversial that humans have
evolved to pick up on prevailing norms in their
groups (whether these norms are implicit/informal
or explicit/formal), assimilate or internalize them,
and feel motivated to adhere to them. Normative
cognition also includes expectations that others
comply with the same norms, along with a desire
to sanction or punish those who do not. Finally,
normative cognition can be accompanied with
feelings of guilt and shame if individuals fail to
adhere to norms that they have come to adopt or
endorse. Indeed, people are, in general, adept at
reasoning about norms (Cosmides and Tooby
2005).
However, any such account of normative cog-
nition will not require anything like the sort of
mind independence that moral objectivism
entails. Normative cognition can include esthetic
matters (e.g., how one ought to dress), prudential
matters (e.g., how one ought to climb the moun-
tain), or matters of propriety (e.g., how one ought
to lay the dinner table). These all seem to depend,
in some way, on the existence of contingent moti-
vations in individuals to adopt them; if one wants
to appear beautiful or be prudent or adhere to
etiquette, then one ought to adopt certain norms
of behavior. But, as just noted, moral norms seem
to be different from these norms. Moral norms
apply regardless of a person’s contingent prefer-
ences or desires. How can one, then, explain the
emergence of distinctively moral norms of this
objective kind?
Some have speculated that moral cognition –
that is, a form of cognition that sees certain norms
as mind-independent, factual, inescapable, and
nonnegotiable – was an evolutionary adaptation
of our species to spur us to prosociality (Joyce
2006). Joyce (2006), for example, speculated that
even though mind-independent moral facts are
entirely ﬁctional, it would have been beneﬁcial
for our species to have evolved a tendency to
think they exist. A tendency to see the world as
ﬁlled with such mind-independent moral facts
would be a much stronger motivator to act pro-
socially. Thus, humans project objective moral
facts into the world through our emotional reac-
tions to morally relevant events. Goodness and
badness, virtue and vice – these are not properties
that exist in the world to be perceived by the mind.
Instead, the mind projects these values into the
world, which then motivates individuals to act
according to moral norms. Thus, evolution selects
for a capacity to objectify morality even while
moral facts do not exist. This account, while spec-
ulative, merits further research.
Responses to Evolutionary Debunking
Those who aim to secure objectivity in ethics have
responded to evolutionary debunking arguments
in a number of different ways. On the one hand,
some have offered third-factor accounts that pur-
port to show that moral judgments do track moral
facts even though they were not selected for this
purpose. On the other hand, some have argued
that that the standards of reliability being invoked
in debunking arguments are too strong; if they
were adopted for other areas of common knowl-
edge, this would lead to an untenable radical
skepticism. These two approaches constitute
well-developed contributions to the debate about
the implications of evolution for moral objectiv-
ity, and they will be considered in turn.
Third-Factor Accounts
The most prominent response to evolutionary cri-
tiques of moral objectivity involves arguing that
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moral judgments do track real moral facts. How-
ever, they do so as a by-product of some other
epistemically respectable cognitive faculty. The
strategy is straightforward: if a plausible evolu-
tionary story can be told about how humans came
to track objective moral facts in spite of the adap-
tive pressures which inﬂuenced ancestral humans’
moral judgments, this might secure the reality of
objective moral facts and maintain their objectiv-
ity at the same time. Different proponents of this
type of response have different capacities in mind
when they propose such “third-factor” accounts –
accounts about some third factor that humans
evolved to track that happens to also align with
moral facts.
Enoch (2010) puts forward a quintessential
third-factor account, which starts from the pre-
mise that survival is (on balance) a good thing.
The advantage of such a starting point is that it is
fairly obvious that adaptive pressures on ancestral
humans did tend to favor their survival. He then
argues that by making choices that assured their
own survival – a good thing (on balance) – ances-
tral humans were in fact tracking moral facts
indirectly. They developed the judgments they
did because those judgments were adaptively
advantageous, and it just so happened that such
those judgments tracked moral facts as a
by-product. Put another way, the capacity to
track moral facts was not directly “selected for”
by adaptive pressures but rather was merely
“selected,” because it was not adaptively advan-
tageous to separate it from other faculties that
were themselves selected for by adaptive pres-
sures. It may be an accident that such an adapta-
tion arose, but once it did, it conferred on ancestral
humans a reliable way of making objective
moral judgments. The capacity to perceive moral
facts might be like the capacity to perceive stars
(Huemer 2005); having the capacity to see stars
did not itself give early humans any adaptive
advantage but rather came about from other
capacities that did confer such adaptive advan-
tage. Other candidates for such third factors
include the badness of pain (Skarsaune 2011),
the importance of having personal boundaries
that others cannot transgress (Wielenberg 2010),
the goodness of altruism (de Lazari-Radek
and Singer 2012), cooperating with others
(Brosnan 2011), or enhancing society’s ability to
meet its needs (Copp 2008). Each of these appeals
to capacities or tendencies which enjoy better
evolutionary pedigree than any purported faculty
of moral judgment.
Nonetheless, Street (2006) objects to third-
factor accounts on the grounds that these accounts
are themselves vulnerable to a Darwinian
dilemma: whatever capacity tracks this third fac-
tor must itself have been selected for as a result of
adaptive pressures on ancestral humans. The
question, then, is what the relation would obtain
between objective moral facts and the evolution of
this capacity. If there is no relation, Street says,
this looks like an implausible and convenient
coincidence. If there is some relation, then the
realist must specify what that relation is. But, she
argues, the capacity that allowed early humans to
(indirectly) track moral truth would have to be
fairly specialized and complex. It is implausible
to think that such a specialized and complex
capacity could have arisen as a by-product of
some other cognitive capacity (Street 2006).
Proponents of third-factor responses generally
deny the claim that grasping moral facts really
requires a complex or specialized capacity in the
ﬁrst place. For instance, de Lazari-Radek and
Singer (2012) argue that this capacity simply
springs from our ability to reason in general,
which is the same capacity involved in grasping
other types of a priori truth (like truths of mathe-
matics; see also FitzPatrick 2014). Similarly, the
capacity to track facts about pain is not specialized
or problematically complex (Skarsaune 2011).
(For a more general defense of third-factor
accounts, see Berker 2014.) If the capacity is
suitably general, this allows the third-factor pro-
ponent to say that the relation between moral
truths and the capacity which tracks them are
unproblematic: humans track moral truths by
their capacity to reason, and this capacity has an
excellent evolutionary pedigree.
Finally, it should be noted that all third-factor
responses invoke a moral assumption from the
start, whether it be the goodness of survival, the
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badness of pain, or any of the other candidates.
Thus, another prominent objection to third-factor
responses targets the legitimacy of this move.
Street argues that any such assumption is “trivially
question-begging,” because it simply assumes the
reliability of our moral judgments, but those are
the very judgements which the evolutionary cri-
tique is meant to undermine (Street 2008,
pp. 216–217). This brings us to the second major
response to evolutionary critiques: the over-
generalization response.
The Overgeneralization Response
The second response to evolutionary critiques
of moral objectivity seeks to undermine the epi-
stemic standards implicit in these critiques. This
approach tries to show that if these standards were
adopted universally, they would imply radical
skepticism. This has also been dubbed “the con-
tainment problem” for evolutionary debunking
arguments (Millhouse et al. 2016). In fact, some
authors argue that the source of doubt implicit in
these evolutionary critiques does not derive from
evolution at all but rather an unjustiﬁed suspicion
about the genealogy or causal history of any
source of knowledge.
Evolutionary critiques of moral objectivity
largely trade on a suspicion about the genealogy
of certain beliefs, but the epistemic standards that
lie behind this suspicion are not often well articu-
lated. As was covered above, the problem intro-
duced by evolution seems to be that adaptive
pressures on the moral judgments of ancestral
humans were not tracking mind-independent
moral facts, and this seems to undermine their
reliability. But one can further ask exactly what
about this lack of truth tracking seems to under-
mine the objectivity of moral judgments. One
possible thought is that if judgments are not track-
ing mind-independent moral facts, this means
there is no good reason to believe they are true.
In general, if one has no good reason to believe
that a belief is true, one ought not to maintain it
(Vavova 2014).
Though this standard looks quite reasonable at
ﬁrst glance, proponents of the overgeneralization
response think it goes too far. Crucially, it depends
on whether a “good” reason is one that must
come from outside the realm of moral judgments
themselves. Street (2008) argues that “third-
factor” accounts are trivially question-begging,
because they rely on moral beliefs in the ﬁrst
place, which are themselves questionable on evo-
lutionary grounds. However, proponents of the
overgeneralization response think this argument
implies far too exacting a standard. The reason is
that if a “good” reason is one that must be inde-
pendent of all moral judgments, a similar argu-
ment can be made about other sources of
knowledge, for example, sense perception. Most
people believe they are justiﬁed in believing the
deliverances of their immediate sense perception,
at least for medium-sized objects in conditions of
sobriety and good lighting. But if they were asked
to justify this judgment without reference to any
beliefs gained from sense perception itself, they
would come up empty-handed (Vavova 2014;
Shafer 2012). This constitutes a clear reductio ad
absurdum: if evolutionary critiques of moral
objectivity rely on an epistemic standard that
would also undermine perceptual beliefs, this is
a good reason not to accept that standard and
therefore also a good reason not to accept the
critiques.
At this point, the proponent of an evolutionary
debunking argument might grant that some judg-
ments in the one domain can justify other judg-
ments in the same domain (whether it be
perceptual or moral). Relaxing epistemic stan-
dards in this way, however, risks allowing third-
factor accounts a metaphorical foot in the door.
If one is allowed to assume that one’s judgments
about the objective badness of pain or the objec-
tive goodness of survival are justiﬁed (despite the
adaptive pressures which caused early humans to
make such judgments), many of one’s more sub-
stantive judgments can be justiﬁed on the basis of
these judgments (Vavova 2014).
On a similar basis, some proponents of this
response argue that evolutionary considerations
can only fail to vindicate moral judgments but
that they are not capable of producing any inde-
pendent skepticism about the reliability of
moral judgments (Brosnan 2011; FitzPatrick
2014; White 2010). This can be shown by imag-
ining a situation of total ignorance of the source
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of moral judgments. If one has no knowledge of
evolution’s inﬂuence on one’s judgments, would
this in any way improve the justiﬁcation of one’s
moral beliefs? The answer seems to be “no.” If
total ignorance of the origins of one’s moral
beliefs does not improve one’s epistemic lot, it is
unclear how the truth of evolution’s impact on
one’s beliefs could make it any worse, short of
showing that these judgments are actually “anti-
reliable.” All that evolutionary debunking argu-
ments can show is that moral judgments are made
in a way that is independent of their truth, but this
does not in itself imply that they are unreliable
(see Brosnan 2011; White 2010).
A related point concerns the metaethical pre-
suppositions inherent in evolutionary debunking
arguments. In order to motivate the case against
objectivism, these arguments take it to be the case
that moral judgment is not truth-tracking. But in
order to fail to be truth-tracking, there must be
some truth to track in the ﬁrst place. After all, if it
turns out that nonobjectivist accounts of moral
facts and concepts are correct, and these things
depend in some way on human attitudes, it is not
clear how evolutionary inﬂuences might under-
mine them (Kahane 2011).
As was covered in the section on “third factor”
accounts above, determining the burden of proof
in this disagreement is quite difﬁcult. Joyce
(2016) claims that given the fact that there is
good reason to believe that humans’ faculty of
moral judgment was not selected for tracking
mind-independent moral facts, the burden rests
on the realist who wants to claim that it does
so. But if the overgeneralization critique of this
argument is correct, it is not clear that the burden
of proof rests on the realist after all. It would seem
that the proponent of an evolutionary critique
must show how evolution’s inﬂuences on moral
judgments render them not just independent of
moral facts but also unreliable. The exact connec-
tion between these two claims constitutes an area
of unfolding debate. Given the implications for a
claim that many psychologists and philosophers
take quite seriously – the objectivity of morality –
quite a lot hangs in the balance.
Conclusion
The relation between moral objectivity and evo-
lution is complex, depending on factors such as
the function of moral judgment, what one takes
moral judgment to be tracking, and the epistemic
standard implicit in our evaluation of moral judg-
ment. Though many philosophers, psychologists,
and ordinary people perceive objectivity to be an
integral part of morality, there is quite a healthy
debate about whether moral objectivity can with-
stand an evolutionary account of human history.
Though there is not yet a consensus, this article
has laid out the main fault lines between propo-
nents of evolutionary skepticism and their realist
opponents.
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